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form of intervention which supervision represents, and that the more draconian care order (which authorises removal of the child from the family) should be available only on proof of the allegations against the parent. This would require primary legislation to amend the Children Act, but it is not inconceivable that the Government might be forced down this road in order to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. The argument was indeed presented by the appellants that the actions of the local authority, in continuing the care proceedings and leaving A in foster care after it realised that the case against the parents could not be proved, was a violation of their rights to family life under Article 8(1). This was cursorily dismissed by Lord Nicholls on the basis that the steps taken were "no more than those reasonably necessary to pursue the legitimate aim of protecting A from further injury" and were thus within the exceptions set out in Article 8(2). It seems entirely likely that parents and other primary carers will continue to invoke the Convention whenever there is a suggestion of compulsory action but the evidence against them is inconclusive. In this, as in other areas of family law, the courts are increasingly going to be called upon to resolve the clash between the fundamental rights of individual family members protected by the Convention-in this case the child's fundamental right to protection and the parents' fundamental right to family integrity. Where the harm has already occurred to the child, as it had in the case of A, the message of Lancashire seems to be that it is legitimate to give priority to the former, whereas where it has not, as in the case of B and in the case of the younger girls in Re H, priority must be given to the latter. form of intervention which supervision represents, and that the more draconian care order (which authorises removal of the child from the family) should be available only on proof of the allegations against the parent. This would require primary legislation to amend the Children Act, but it is not inconceivable that the Government might be forced down this road in order to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. The argument was indeed presented by the appellants that the actions of the local authority, in continuing the care proceedings and leaving A in foster care after it realised that the case against the parents could not be proved, was a violation of their rights to family life under Article 8(1). This was cursorily dismissed by Lord Nicholls on the basis that the steps taken were "no more than those reasonably necessary to pursue the legitimate aim of protecting A from further injury" and were thus within the exceptions set out in Article 8(2). It seems entirely likely that parents and other primary carers will continue to invoke the Convention whenever there is a suggestion of compulsory action but the evidence against them is inconclusive. In this, as in other areas of family law, the courts are increasingly going to be called upon to resolve the clash between the fundamental rights of individual family members protected by the Convention-in this case the child's fundamental right to protection and the parents' fundamental right to family integrity. Where the harm has already occurred to the child, as it had in the case of A, the message of Lancashire seems to be that it is legitimate to give priority to the former, whereas where it has not, as in the case of B and in the case of the younger girls in Re H, priority must be given to the latter. But is this not also open to the objection that we ought not to have to wait for serious harm to befall a child before taking protective measures? 
